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Summary of Findings
IN the hope that the major findings can be so presented that an at-
tentive reader can follow them without referring to the detailed dis-
cussion, it seems useful to provide a summary—if only to bring the
threads of the analysis together in a conveniently brief account. In
the process of summarizing, however, itisdifficult to avoid over-
simplifying and, in omitting evidence and qualification, claiming
too much. The critical reader should, therefore, turn to the sub-
stantive chapters.
The Central Topic (Chapters 1 and 2)
By capital formation we mean diversion of part of the current product
for use as capital, that is, goods to produce other goods or income.
Specifically, it is defined here to include current construction, flow
of producers' durable equipment to users, net additions to inventories
of business units and other agencies (but not households), and—in
order to allow for this country's position among others—net changes in
claims against foreign countries. Gross capital formation is the sum of
these four components before deduction of current consumption of
fixed capital—construction and producers' durables. Net capital forma-
tion is the sum of these four components after deduction of current
consumption of fixed capital. In the concepts used here, the sum of
gross capital formation and flow of goods to ultimate consumers
(households or associations of these) is gross national product. The
sum of net capital formation and flow of goods to ultimate consumers
is net national product or national income—the two terms being used
interchangeably here.
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Two aspects of this definition of capital formation must be noted
even in a brief summary. First, we exclude additions to or drafts upon
the stock of capital that result from forces extraneous to economic
processes proper. Manna from heaven and fire from hell, fortuitous
legacies of nature and the destruction of war, may affect the stock of
capital at the disposal of a nation. These effects are not included in
capital formation, inasmuch as our interest is in economic processes
and in the way they operate to augment or reduce productive wealth
at our disposal. This interest is justified, in that additions to capital
from current product have been by far the major component of the
change in capital stock. If we lived in a world in which productive
wealth was greatly and frequently affected by other means, our in-
terest in capital formation as part of current economic product would
be far less intense.
The second exclusion from our totals is much more important. The
greatest factor in economic capacity to produce is the stock of knowl-
edge—not measured by the commodities (or foreign claims) that enter
our capital formation totals. Indeed, there is a question whether such
stock can be measured directly in a meaningful fashion. However,
among the items that we include in flow of goods to ultimate con-
sumers, some distinctly measure inputs that add to our stock of knowl-
edge, as for example, outlays on education and research; and others
contribute to an increase in the productive capacity of human beings
by making them healthier and happier, as for example, outlays on
medical care and recreation. These items, if identifiable, could be as-
signed economic magnitudes. But there are two reasons for excluding
such uses of current product from capital formation. First, it is hard
to draw the line between uses of such goods for the purpose of adding
to productive capacity and their uses for a richer life. Second, these in-
vestments by ultimate consumers, unlike the components of capital
formation defined here, are not part and parcel of the complicated
mechanism of capital investment and financing. Yet for many pur-
poses—particularly the study of economic growth over long periods
and among widely different societies—the concept of capital and capi-
tal formation should be broadened to include investment in the health,
education, and training of the population itself, that is, investment
in human beings. From this point of view the concept of capital forma-
tion followed here is too narrow.
Why, then, do we study capital formation made up of additions to
the stock of tangible capital goods? Simply because this stock is in-
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dispensabletoadequately high levelsof economic productivity.
Granted that, without the accumulated body of knowledge and a
healthy and educated labor force, such stock of capital is useless. Yet,
if knowledge does exist and human labor is available to apply it, ef-
fective use of those resources requires material capital goods. Major
additions to our technology—the mechanization of spinning or weav-
ing, the introduction of coal and coke for smelting iron and mak-
ing steeel, the invention of the stationary steam engine and its use for
transportation, the discovery of electric power and its production in
giant hydroelectric plants, and the brilliant promises of power and
automation from applications of atomic energy—each has called for
large inputs of resources into construction and equipment. One per.
sistent bottleneck in the use of knowledge in economic production has
been the scarcity of the resources for the production of capital goods
needed for the application of new knowledge. Furthermore, since
efficient production requires some minimum of capital goods per
worker, the growth of population and the labor force requires accumu-
lation of more capital. This is so even if no capital-demanding innova-
tions are introduced, provided that capital-saving inventions do not
swing the balance in favor of the same or higher efficiency with a
lower supply of capital per worker.
Capital formation is, therefore, our primary interest because it is
essential to economic productivity and economic growth. And since
capital formation is diversion from current product, on a countrywide
scale it represents the real savings of the nation. In a society such as
ours, the basic decisions that determine capital formation are those
made by households, business units, and governments, in the disposi.
tion of their income between current expenditures and savings. It is
these savings that finance capital formation, i.e., permit the would-be
users of capital to secure funds for the purchase of capital goods. The
relations between national capital formation and the savings of various
groups within the nation, which fall under the title of financing, are
complex. The question that provides the guiding thread in our study is
what determines the volume, composition, and industrial destination
of capital formation, and financing is treated as a mechanism, the
analysis of which is needed to illuminate approaches to that question.
Capital formation and its financing are strategic not only for long-
run economic change—as one group of conditions for economic growth—
but also for the short-term fluctuations that affect the course of a
country's economic activity—its business cycles. As long known, capi.
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tal formation fluctuates during business cycles with a far wider am-
plitude than does flow of consumer goods; and a similarly high sensi-
tivity to business cycles is characteristic of the savings of individuals,
business firms, and even governments. For these reasons, the role of
capital formation and financing in business cycles, in connection with
the problem of economic stability, has long been a subject of economic
analysis—of direct bearing upon economic policy. But here our interest
lies in the long-term aspects, the trends in capital formation that are
of more direct bearing upon economic growth than upon stability,
although the two are interrelated.
Long-term trends are sustained movements in one direction, move-
ments that dwarf any fluctuations around or deviations from them.
While their measurement requires statistical tools for distinguishing
them from the short-term fluctuations, neither the long-term trends
nor the short-term cycles are mere statistical artifacts. Life may impress
us with its day-to-day ups and downs, and we may often feel that a
persistent long-term trend is an illusion. But individuals, business firms,
and governments do plan for the longer-range future—a range tran-
scending a month, a year, or even a decade; and, with due allowance
for partial failure, the plans are carried through. There is continuity
in society, within generations and between generations. And the
quantitative data for many aspects of economic production, with
no statistical manipulation whatever, display impressive and sustained
rises, on which the short-term fluctuations appear as mere ripples.
Long-term trends might have been illusory in both the Old World and
the New when, for lack of knowledge of natural processes and means
of controlling them, the rate of population increase was very low with
correspondingly low economic growth potentials. Populations were
preoccupied with survival and subsistence, with many a setback (dis-
ease, natural calamities, massacres, famines) in the struggle. The last
one and a half to two centuries have witnessed, in many now devel-
oped countries, long-term trends that far surpassed those of the past
in both magnitude and the sustained character of the rise.
In measuring long-term trends in capital formation and financing in
this country, we find, however, in addition to short-term fluctuations
of some four to nine years' duration—associated with business cycles—
long swings in the rate of growth, spanning roughly twenty years.
These long swings are particularly prominent in nonfarm residential
and related construction, and in durable capital investment by rail.
roads; and they are sufficiently marked in many other components of
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capital formation and financing to merit attention. Both the statistical
treatment and the analytical discussion are, therefore, complicated
by the distinction between the long-term trends and the long swings—
the former being sustained movements that transcend even the latter
in duration.
Trends in Total Capital Formation (Chapter 3)
The measures of capital formation used here extend back to 1869,
thus covering a period of over eight and a half decades. It may be
asked whether it is realistic to view this long period as framing a con-
tinuous process. in which the economy almost ninety years ago is re-
garded as comparable with the economy today. The treatment is a
working assumption, hardly susceptible of definitive proof. All that
can be said here is: the period covers not much more than three gen-
erations; numerous economic actions initiated even in the 1870's—on
railroads and other investments, on expansion to the West, on corpo-
rate organization and regulation, to mention but a few—are still in-
fluencing us today. Even if many material trappings of the 1950's are
the results of inventions and innovations that were unknown in the
1870's, they may at least have been dreamed of then. The basic lines
that guide our society are not so novel that our forebears of the post-
Civil War days would not find much that is familiar to them and
would not be able to understand the problems of economic growth,
stability, and security that concern us today. To declare that we live
in a new era implies that our past has lost all meaning for us, that it
has ceased to influence the patterns of our present life and our individ-
ual and institutional responses to the problems of the day. We find it
impossible to deny the effects of the past on the present, and hence,
on the future.
In measuring long-term trends in capital formation since 1869 we
use averages covering twenty to thirty years in order to free the meas-
ures from effects of the long, twenty-year swings noted above. The
only exception is the single post-World War II decade, used to give
us some idea of the recent levels compared with the past, although
there is a persistent question whether the averages for 1946—1955 truly
represent the long-term trend levels unaffected by the phasing of the
long swing.
The growth in the volume of capital formation can first be sum-
marized in terms of dollar values in constant (1929) prices. In this
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summary we deal with capital formation, excluding the military items
(military construction and munitions), which are studied separately
in the detailed discussion, and the inclusion of which modifies the
broad long-term trends only slightly. We use Variant III national prod-
uct, for which our estimates are most detailed, although the results
yielded by Variants I and II are not very different from those of III.
1. The annual volume of gross capital formation rose from about
$3.5 billion in 1869—1888 to $19 billion in 1929—1955, and $30 billion
in 1946—1955. This long-term rise over some three-quarters of a century
was thus to about nine times the original level.
2. Capital consumption(depreciation)charges,estimatedhere
largely on the basis of constant economic life spans and straight-line
depreciation, also rose rapidly, from an annual level of about $1.5
billion in 1869—1888 to over $14 billion in 1929—1955 and slightly over
$19 billion in 1946—1955. The rise here was, therefore, to about thirteen
times the initial level.
3. Net capital formation also grew appreciably, from $2.0 billion per
year in 1869—1888 to $4.7 billion in 1929—1955 (when the average was
greatly reduced by the depression of the 1930's and the war emergency
of 1942—1945), and to about $10.5 billion in 1946—1955. The rise was
to over five times the initial level.
4. Large and rising volumes of capital formation mean cumulatively
enormous additions to the stock of reproducible capital at the disposal
of the economy. Even the "nettest" measure of this stock—that ad-
justed for all cumulated depreciation—grew from $27 billion in 1869
to $419 billion in 1955, or between fifteen and sixteen times its original
level. The rise is still striking when the net stock of reproducible wealth
is related to the labor force or total population: per member of the
labor force, it rose from $2,100 in 1869 to $6,400 in 1955, more than
tripling; per capita, it rose from $700 in 1869 to $2,500 in 1955, almost
quadrupling.
This record of long-term growth in capital formation and in the
stock of reproducible wealth is just as familiar as it is impressive. It
is common knowledge that, over the decades since 1869, population
and economic product of this country grew at high rates. Population
increased from 40 million in 1869 to 166 million in 1955, while the
labor force grew from 13 million to 66 million. With more people and
workers, there was inducement to accumulate more capital not only
to supply the workers with tools, households with residences, and
other units with needed buildings, but to provide all with roads,
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bridges, inventories, and so on. With more labor at hand, there was
at least one means of doing it. Net national product in 1929 prices
grew from $267 per capita in 1869—1888 to $974 in 1946—1955. That
growth was both cause and effect of the growth in capital formation.
It was cause in that increased product made possible a larger diversion
to capital stock, and it was effect in that the growing volume of capi-
tal formation and the growing stock of capital permitted higher total
output per worker and per capita.
In this impressive but familiar story, the only point to be noted is
the striking rise in capital consumption. Since it grew at an appreciably
higher rate than that of gross capital formation, its ratio to the latter
also rose—from 0.4 in 1869—1888 to 0.65 in 1946—1955. In other words,
in the earlier period it took $1.7 of gross capital formation to provide
$1 of net capital formation, i.e., net addition to capital stock; in the
recent decade it took almost $3 of gross capital formation to do so.
What caused that trend, and what is the significance of the growing
share of consumption (replacement) in gross capital formation?
The causes are many and technical, but can be summarized briefly
and, we hope, intelligibly. First, given a constant economic life span
of a durable good (and a simple depreciation schedule), current de-
preciation or consumption is a mirror of past gross additions. If such
additions grow at a decreasing percentage rate, the ratio of current
consumption or depreciation to current gross capital formation will
rise. Second, if the average economic life span of durable capital de-
clines over time, either because the rate of obsolescence or economic
deterioration of a specific good rises, or (as actually happens) the share
of the shorter.lived producers' equipment rises relative to the longer-
lived construction component, this, too, will cause the ratio of capital
consumption to gross capital formation to rise. The third factor, which
is in a way a variant of the second, has to do with the share of de-
preciable durable capital relative to the nondepreciable net compo-
nents—net changes in inventories and in claims against foreign coun-
tries. If the share of depreciable durable capital in total gross capital
formation rises, the result again will be a rise in the ratio of capital
consumption to total gross capital formation. In fact, all three of the
immediate determinants just noted have operated over the time span
covered here. The percentage rate of growth of gross capital formation
has declined, in association with the slowing down in the rate of
growth of population and of national product. The share of pro-
ducers' durable equipment in gross durable capital formation has
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risen, and quite appreciably; and the weight of durable capital forma-
tion, subject to depreciation, in gross capital formation has also risen.
While the immediate determinants of the rise in the ratio of capital
consumption to gross capital formation can be clearly seen, the sig-
nificance of the rise is not easy to assay. The estimate of capital con-
sumption is after allowance for maintenance and repair. It does not
represent physical deterioration, or a decline in the physical capacity
of the capital good to produce. It is largely a measure of obsolescence,
reflecting the appearance of new and more efficient capital goods with
the passage of time. Consequently, replacement of capital consumed
means raising the productive capacity over and above the old to the
extent measured by the rate of obsolescence—and this is particularly
true of producers' capital equipment. An increasing ratio of capital
consumption to gross capital formation does not mean that more new
capital must be used for replacement, to make good the ravages of
physical deterioration. It is rather a measure of the proportion of new
capital that is needed to bring the existing stock to the latest level of
efficiency. Net capital formation, then, is what remains for addition
to capital stock, after the existing stock has been replaced to com-
pensate for the lag in efficiency behind the ever-rising level set by
advancing technology.
Any explanation of the levels of, and trends in, capital formation
must relate it to national product. When this relation is considered,
a query arises why the volumes and rates of growth in capital accumu-
lated, large as they have been, have not been larger.
5. Gross capital formation accounted for about one-fifth of gross
national product, both in current and in constant prices. When the
comparison is in constant prices, the trend in the ratio is downward—
from 22.6 per cent in 1869—1888 to 21.5 per cent in 1909—1928 and to
17.6 per cent in 1946—1955. When the comparison is in current prices,
there is a very mild rise or general long-term stability, the percentages
being 20.2 in 1869—1888, 20.9 in 1909—1928, and 21.3 in 1946—1955.
6. With gross capital formation a stable or declining proportion of
gross national product, and the ratio of capital consumption to gross
capital formation rising appreciably, the ratio of net capital formation
to national income (or net national product) shows a distinct down-
ward trend. For volumes in constant prices, the share declines from
14.6 per cent in 1869—1888 to 11.2 in 1909—1928 and to 7.0 per cent in
1946—1955; for volumes in current prices the movement is from 13.0 per
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cent in 1869—1888 to 11.0 per cent in 1909—1928 and to 8.7 per cent in
1946—1955.
7. A related measure is the ratio of net capital stock to net national
product. This average capital-output ratio rises from 3.2 in 1869—1888
to 3.6 in 1909—1928, but drops to 2.5 in 1946—1955. Even in 1929—1955,
when the ratio is raised by underutilization of capital during the de-
pression of the 1930's and the war years, 1942—1945 (military items are
excluded here and above), it is 3.3—somewhat lower than in 1909—1928.
In other words, in recent decades a larger product could be turned out
with less capital investment. And this earlier rise and recent decline
in the capital-output ratio is also evident when we relate the grosser
capital stock total, net of retirements only, to the appropriate national
product total.
In the light of these findings, the query raised above can be amplified
by asking why, if real product per capita grew 20 per cent per decade,
the long-term net national saving rate was below 15 per cent; why it
declined instead of rising; and why the share of gross capital formation
in gross national product barely exceeded 20 per cent and at best
showed only a very slight rise, even for current prices volumes.
These questions can be answered in two ways. One emphasizes the
demand for capital funds and implies that under the existing economic
and social conditions larger ex ante savings would not have found an
outlet because capital investment opportunities were limited. If—to
illustrate—technological and other factors determine how much capi-
tal is needed per unit of final product at a given time, that is, if they
fix the level of the net capital-output ratio at, say, not more than 3
or 4 to 1, a rise in final product (national income) at the rate of 4 per
cent per year would mean a ratio of net capital formation to national
income of not more than 0.12 or 0.16 (0.04 X 3, or 0.04 x4).Yet there
are major flaws in this approach to the questions. The purely tech-
nological constraints are clear only if we deal with a single product,
and with the minimum capital stock needed to produce it. Even then,
the actual ratio can vary within wide limits above the indispensable
minimum, since the range of choice is wide—in the intensity of utiliza-
tion of capital and in the recourse to more or less capital-intensive
processes. When we deal with a variety of products, as included in
national income, the divergence between the minimum capital-output
ratio and the one that may, actually be realized is all the wider, be-
cause if capital funds are readily available the economy may emphasize
the more capital-intensive industries or processes. In particular, when
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we consider the large stock of new knowledge awaiting productive ex-
ploitation and the wide investment opportunities abroad that pre-
sumably existed throughout most of the period under discussion, it is
difficult to assume that the level of capital formation and the factors
behind the stability of the gross capital formation proportion and
the decline of the net capital formation proportion are the results of
long-run limitations upon the supply of capital investment oppor-
tunities.
The alternative approach, which emphasizes the supply of savings,
seems more plausible and more fruitful as an analytical lead. Given
the limited relative contributions to nationwide savings that, under
our institutional conditions, could be made by corporations (in the
form of undistributed profits) and by governments, the main question
suggested by this approach is why the ultimate consumers in our rapidly
growing economy managed to save only a small proportion of their
income (at best slightly over 10 per cent), and a proportion which, on
a net basis, declined rather than rose, despite rising real income per
capita.
The various arguments advanced to answer this question indicate
that, among the income groups below the very top, savings reasonably
justified by the needs they are to serve (retirement, reserves, etc.) can
be but a moderate fraction of income; that the share of the very top
income groups in total income has been limited both by the very
dynamism of our economy and by public policy (on income and in-
heritance taxation) which have restricted cumulative concentration of
wealth in the same hands, and that these limits on the share in income
of the top income groups also held down their share in total savings.
Central to all the causes of the low savings-income proportion are
the basic features of our economic and social life which, with the free
association and mobility among economic groups, made for a strong
drive for emulative consumption, and the continuous technological
changes in both consumer and producer goods, which stimulated a
high and rapidly rising consumption demand. At the same time, many
expanding consumer expenditures represented education, training, and
preparation for higher earnings in the future, and were in fact, for
the individuals concerned, substitutes for money savings of the type
used to finance capital formation as defined here. Also, forced saving
through credit creation by financial institutions and government is
subject to limits of its own, in its possible effect on voluntary saving.
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Finally, in recent years, particularly since World War II, monetary
savings of individuals and corporations have often been heavily offset
by government dissavings, that is, by expenditures on current uses
(and on military durables, excluded from capital formation in this
summary) financed by borrowing rather than by current revenues.
The analysis of trends in total capital formation is thus linked with
the discussion of the factors determining the volume of savings, which
leads us to the forces that determine the volume of savings of income
groups below the top, the forces that set the share of the very top
income groups, and those that limit savings of corporations and govern-
ments. The analysis thus indicates the need to examine the whole
economic and social structure of income recipients and of a wide range
of economic institutions; it can therefore do little more than indicate
the directions of further exploration. The conclusion of our discus-
sion—that the limitation on savings available for financing capital
formation held down capital formation levels and may have accounted
for the decline in the net capital formation proportion—cannot, there-
fore, be more than a reasonable impression. The empirical data are
not sufficient to permit us to tell whether the factors adduced spell a
net capital formation proportion of 10, 15, or 20 per cent, and un-
mistakably indicate a declining rather than a constant or slightly rising
trend. And, in general, ex post facto data can never provide definite
proof. They cannot enable us to discriminate properly between two
alternative hypotheses each of which refers to ex ante assumptions: (1)
that would-be savings were greater than would-be capital investment
opportunities (and that, therefore, the latter served as a brake); or (2)
that would-be savings were smaller than would-be capital investment
opportunities (and that, therefore, the former served as a brake).
Furthermore, the arguments summarized above deal with long-term
factors, on both the demand-for-capital and the supply-of-savings sides.
In the short run, the level of capital formation can be below the
available supply of savings, because the supply may be offered in dif-
ferent forms and on different conditions from those of the demand
for capital funds. In the long run, the meshing of supply and demand
for funds is attained, and that is the chief purpose of the complex
structure of financial intermediaries. But in the short run, supply and
demand may not mesh, and the short run is ever with us. In this
sense, capital formation may be limited not merely by the supply of
savings or the demand for capital investment but also by the factors
that produce a short-term mismatching of the two and by the off-
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setting forces that facilitate and accelerate their adjustment at the
highest possible level of capital investment.
Trends in the Structure of Capital Formation (Chapter 4)
In studying a large aggregate like this country's capital formation,
much can be learned by examining its components, if they are affected
by different factors and hence behave differently. Our classifications are
governed largely by the availability of data, but the data, in turn,
reflect commonly observed differences in form, type, and channel of
capital formation. The trends in the components, like those in the
totals, have to be studied with the aid of averages for twenty to thirty
years.
With several classifications to be considered, the summary follows
the order of the discussion in Chapter 4 and deals separately with the
trends in (1) net changes in claims against foreign countries; (2) struc-
ture of domestic capital formation by type of capital good—construc-
tion, producers' durables, and net changes in inventories; (3) structure
of domestic capital formation by category of user—households, business
firms, and governments; (4) shares of selected industry sectors—agri-
culture, mining, manufacturing, and the regulated industries—in net
business durable capital formation.
NET CHANGES IN CLAIMS AGAINST FOREIGN COUNTRIES
1. Gross sources of foreign claims against this country (imports of
commodities and services, income on foreign investments, and net uni-
lateral transfers) have ranged over long periods (since 1874) between
5 and 8 per cent of gross national product, excluding war years but
including military items throughout, since these may give riseto
claims. The trend was slightly downward, from 8 per cent in 1874—1895
to 6.8 per cent in 1946—1955. However, the long-term decline is much
sharper if we allow for the supporting effects of unilateral transfers
on exports. If we exclude these gifts and grants to other countries,
which add to their claims against us, the ratio of foreign inflows to
gross national product drops from close to 8 per cent in 1874—1895,
to less than 6 per cent in 1923—1928, and to 5 per cent in 1946—1955.
2. Gross sources of claims by the United States against foreign coun-
tries (exports, and income on investment abroad) ranged from 5.6 to
7.5 per cent of gross national product, excluding war periods but in-
cluding military items in gross national product, and the ratio showed
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no apparent long-term trend. However, the constancy may have been
due in part to the bolstering effect of exports by the proportional in-
crease in unilateral transfers.
3. The net balance of inflows and outflows (net foreign capital in-
vestment) changed from negative in 1874—1914, that is, from net im-
ports of capital, to positive, or to net investment abroad, despite large
unilateral transfers. Except for war periods, the net foreign balance
proportions to gross national product, including military, were quite
small—less than 1 per cent.
4. These net balances were also moderate fractions of gross capital
formation (excluding military items), rising from about —2 per cent in
1869—1898 to a peak of +8 per cent in 1899—1928, and dropping to +2
per cent in 1946—1955. They were larger fractions of net capital forma-
tion, ranging from net foreign investment here of about 3 per cent in
1868—1898 to flow of capital abroad of about 20 per cent in 1919—1948
(a proportion raised by the small volume of net domestic capital for-
mation in the depressed 1930's and through the war years), and drop-
ping to less than 6 per cent in 1946—1955.
These findings suggest three questions discussed in detail in Chap-
ter 4.
The first concerns the small contribution that foreign capital made
to capital formation in this country from the 1870's to World War I—
surprising in view of the rapid growth of this country during that
period and the large investment opportunities that it presumably pro-
vided. A brief summary of the discussion in Chapter 4 must suffice here.
The limited proportional contribution of foreign capital to the
national product and capital formation in the United States is ex-
plained by the following facts: the economic magnitude of all would-be
creditor countries was limited relative to that of all would-be debtor
countries, even if we assume that all the savings of the former could
be channeled into foreign investment; only a portion of the domestic
savings of foreign net creditor countries was available for flow abroad,
the rest being required at home for uses connected with the needs of
members of the community who remained at home and would not be
induced to migrate by the greater prospects of growth in the would-be
borrower countries; of all savings available for foreign investment, a
substantial fraction was channeled with political considerations or
advantages in mind, of little importance in respect to the United
States—neither a colony nor an active participant in the diplomatic
combinations of the Old World. One might add that, in general, a
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large and rapidly developing country is unlikely to secure a large pro-
portion of its capital formation from abroad. The conditions favoring
its rapid growth also favor rapid accumulation of domestic savings, and
whatever it secured from the limited pool of capital funds available
for economically motivated foreign investment could not be a domi-
nant fraction of its own large domestic savings.
The second question—why the United States shifted to a net creditor
position even while its domestic growth and internal need for savings
were presumably still high—can also be answered by summarizing the
more detailed discussion. It was essentially a matter of a more rapid
rise in capital exports than in the inflow of capital from abroad. The
rise in capital exports was due partly to the greater stimulus for direct
investment abroad—a reflection of the growing reliance on imports of
raw materials and on exports of manufactured products. Another factor
was the greater availability of savings accessible for portfolio invest-
ment abroad—a result largely of the growth of the network of financial
institutions that externalized savings and made them more fluid. The
rise resulted also from the necessarily greater involvement of the old
creditor countries in world wars, which necessitated repatriation of
their funds from this country during the war periods, and created con-
ditions (extending into the postwar years) in which lending by this
country was stimulated largely on government account and as a matter
of national interest.
The third question, concerning the factors limiting capital outflow
from the United States, once it became a net creditor, to small pro-
portions of its national product and capital formation, can be answered
partly by specific reference to conditions existing since World War I—
a combination of pressing needs for capital formation at home and o.
disturbed conditions in many would-be borrower countries. A more
general answer would suggest that, aside from the transient pressures
that occur during wars, so long as growth of population and advances
in technology assure domestic demand for savings originating in this
country, even peaceful conditions do not necessarily mean that large
proportions of savings would be available for foreign capital invest-
ment by the United States. The very size of the country, and those char-
acteristics of its structure noted above in explaining the limited savings
propensities and capital formation proportions also suggest the reasons
for the limited proportions (although not the absolute amounts) of
savings normally available for investment abroad to total savings or to
national product.
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STRUCTURE OF DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATiON, BY TYPE OF CAPITAL GOOD
1. The share of gross construction in domestic gross capital formation
declined: for volumes in current prices, it dropped from over 60 per
cent in the successive thirty-year periods ending in 1918 to 54 per cent
in 1929—1955 (and to 53 per cent in 1946—I 955); for volumes in constant
prices, it declined from close to 70 per cent to less than 50 per cent
in 1929—1955 (and 1946—1955). The share of net changes in inventories
also declined: for totals in current prices, from about 15 per cent in
1869—1898 to about 5 per cent in 1929—1955 (and 1946—1955); for totals
in constant prices, from about 10 per cent in 1869—1898 to about 6 per
cent in 1929—1955 (and 8 per cent in 1946—1955). The share of pro-
ducers' durable equipment rose, and quite markedly: for volumes in
current prices, from somewhat over 20 per cent in 1869—1898 to over
40 per cent in 1929—1955 (and 1946—1955); for volumes in constant
prices, from about 20 per cent to almost 45 per cent in 1929—1955 (and
almost 46 per cent in 1946—1955).
2. The long-term trends in the structure of domestic net capital
formation are a bit different. The share of net construction declined,
particularly for volumes in constant prices. The share of net producers'
durables rose—even more conspicuously than in the gross totals—from
somewhat over 10 per cent in 1869—1 898 (for volumes in constant prices)
to 37 per cent in 1929—1955 (and to 29 per cent in 1946—1955). But the
trends in the share of net changes in inventories differ from the trends
intheir share in domestic gross capital formation:for net vol-
umes in current prices, the share still declined, although moderately,
from over 25 per cent in 1869—1898 to 17 per cent in 1929—1955 (and
to 16 per cent in 1946—1955); for volumes in constant prices, it tended
to rise. In either case, however, even the thirty-year averages show up-
and-down movements in the share of net changes in inventories in the
domestic net capital formation total.
3. Within total construction we can distinguish nonfarm residential,
government, and "other." This last category (a residual) includes farm
construction, business and plant construction, and construction by non-
profit institutions, but the business sector dominates it. On the basis
of values in constant prices, we find that the share of governments in
total construction rose rapidly and markedly, to the point where the
share of government construction in total domestic capital formation
also rose. The share of nonfarm residential construction in gross con-
struction declined somewhat, from 40 per cent in 1869—1898 to about
30 per cent in 1929—1955 (and 34 per cent in 1946—1955), but its share
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in the net total rose from over 50 per cent in 1869—1898 to 64 per cent
in 1929—1955 (and 58 per cent in 1946—1955). In either case, the share
of nonfarm residential construction in domestic capital formation
would show a downward trend—but not a marked one. It is the share
of other construction in both gross and net total construction that
markedly declined: in gross, from well above 50 per cent in 1869—1898
to below 40 per cent in 1929—1955 (and 1946—1955); in net, from above
40 per cent in 1869—1898 to a negative amount in 1929—1955 (and to 15
per cent in 1946—1955). Obviously, the sharp drop in the rate of growth
of other construction accounts largely for the decline in the share of
construction in total domestic capital formation.
Some of these findings bear closely upon the allocation of capital
formation among major user groups and can best be discussed in the
next section. Here we limit our comments to the trends in the share of
net changes in inventories in domestic capital formation, and in the
share of other—essentially business—construction, relative to those in
the share of producers' durable equipment.
Our long-term estimates of net changes in inventories are less re-
liable than those of the other capital formation components, and our
knowledge of the factors that determine allocation of capital forma-
tion between them and the other components is equally limited. The
one argument advanced in the discussion begins with the obvious
statement that net changes in inventories and net durable capital
formation, particularly business, serve the same end, that is, facilitate
additions to final product. If we assume that the ratios of net changes
in inventories and net durable capital formation to additions to final
product remain constant (or are subject to similar trends), the. share
of net changes in inventories in net domestic capital formation will
remain constant. We know that the share of capital consumption in
gross domestic capital formation rose, and that the share of net in
gross domestic capital formation declined. It follows that a constant
or even slightly rising share of net changes in inventories in net do-
mestic capital formation means a declining share in gross domestic
capital formation. In this explanation of the findings just noted, the
unresolved point is whether the ratios of net changes in inventories
and of net durable capital formation to additions to final product were
constant or moved similarly. There is ground for assuming that the
same factors determine both ratios to some extent: expansion of dura-
ble capital also means expansion of inventories. Our estimates per-
mit us to calculate the ratios and see how they moved, but in view of
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the crudity of the inventory estimates, great reliance cannot be placed
on this evidence.
The rise in the share of producers' durable equipment and the de.
dine in the share of other construction in domestic capital formation,
whether gross or net, mean that within durable business capital forma-
tion, gross or net, the shift away from construction and toward durable
equipment (machinery, tools, etc.) has been marked. No complete ex-
planation of this shift is provided by the data at our disposal, but some
forces behind it can be suggested. The trend is apparently the result of
a combination of intraindustry and interindustry shifts. Within certain
major industrial sectors—agriculture, mining, manufacturing, the regu-
lated industries (particularly the last)—the early phases of expansive
growth and capital formation were characterized by substantial shares
of construction. The new farm structures, industrial plants, and trans-
portation systems were built, and the initial heavy investment in track,
buildings, and so on, was made. In the later phases of their growth
these industries could turn out an increasing volume of product with
minor additions in construction, and there was a shift to more equip-
ment. Among the industrial sectors, those with a higher ratio of con-
struction to equipment, particularly the utilities, were of far greater
weight in total business capital formation between the 1870's and 1914
than in more recent decades, and that interindustry shift contributed
to the declining share of construction relative to that of machinery and
equipment. Along the same lines, certain recent technological changes
may also have contributed to the same result: the modern type in-
dustries producing highly fabricated, lighter products tend to have a
lower ratio of construction to equipment than the older type indus-
tries producing primary metal shapes and other simpler kinds of prod-
ucts. Interestingly enough, there were similar trends away from the
heavy construction frame and base to more equipment even within
nonfarm residential construction.
STRUCTURE OF DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION, BY CATEGORY OF USER
The distribution of domestic capital formation among households,
business firms, and governments is crude, because we have to employ
for this purpose the components already distinguished by type of capi.
tal good. Thus the share of households is identified with that of non-
farm residential construction, and is too small, in that it excludes farm
housing. The share of governments is limited to government construc-
tion (local, state, and federal) and is too small, in that it excludes pro-
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ducers' durable equipment flowing to governments, and changes in
government inventories. The share of business firms—a sum of "other"
construction, producers' durable equipment, and net changes in in-
ventories—is too large, in that it includes most of the items excluded
from the other categories, as well as capital formation by nonprofit
institutions. Yet, granting these defects in the classification, the broad
trends differ little from those that would be revealed by a more ac-
curate classification.
1. The share of the government sector rose, in both gross and net
domestic capital formation, in both constant and current prices. The
share in the gross totals rose from less than 5 per cent in the early
decades to over 15 per cent in 1929—1955; the share in the net totals
rose from less than 5 per cent to 24 or 28 per cent in 1929—1955, and
to 15 or 13 per cent in 1946—1955. This rise would be somewhat greater
if we could include durable equipment flowing to governments and
changes in their inventories.
2. With this rise in the share of governments, the share of the private
sector—a sum of households and business firms—declined, and the
decline would tend to characterize the share of each of the two private
user sectors. Of greater interest are the differences in trend between
the two private sectors, in the long-term movements in the shares of
households and of business firms in total private domestic capital
formation. On the basis of the gross totals, the share of households
declined: moderately for totals in current prices (from 24 per cent in
1869—1898 to 22 per cent in 1899—1928, to 21 per cent in 1929—1955,
and to 21.5 per cent in 1946—1955); and more sharply for totals in con-
stant prices (from 29 per cent in 1869—1898 to 23 per cent in 1899—1928,
and to 18 per cent in both 1929—1955 and 1946—1955). The picture
changes when we shift to net totals: for totals in current prices, the
share of households shows a rise (moving from 30 per cent in 1869—
1898 to 29 per cent in 1899—1928, to 40 per cent in 1929—1955, and
to 38 per cent in 1946—1955); for totals in constant prices, however,
the share of households again dropped, though rather moderately
(moving from 38 per cent in 1869—1898 to 30 per cent in 1899—1928, to
34 per cent in 1929—1955, and to 32 per cent in 1946—1955). The de-
cline (or rise in net, in current prices) in the share of the household
sector in total private domestic capital formation is matched by a
rise (or decline in net, in current prices) in the share of the business
sector, although—to repeat—the shares of both private sectors in the
totals including governments tended to decline.
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The marked rise in the share of the government sector in domestic
capital formation—even when military items are excluded, as here—
is closely associated with the rise in the share of governments in em-
ployment and other aspects of economic activity. The underlying
factors are discussed in some detail elsewhere. Here we merely add
that this trend in the allocation of capital formation is a combina-
tion of two variables. One, the rising share of governments in eco-
nomic activity, is a result of the growing complexity of the domestic
structure and of international relations, which compels the govern-
ments to assume greater responsibility for facilitating and supervising
internal stability and growth and for assuring external security. The
other variable, the relation between the volume of government activ-
ity and the capital needed for it, is a ratio that cannot be measured
precisely, but it is not likely to be lower than the capital-output ratio
for the private sector, and its trend may have made for a greater rela-
tive draft by governments upon capital investment. Further explora-
tion in this direction calls for the long-needed scrutiny of the capital
and income flows in the government sector, involving a functional
analysis of government expenditures on both current and capital ac-
count.
On the rather disparate trends in the distribution of private capital
formation between the household and business sectors, only general
comments are appropriate here First, if gross capital formation by the
business sector and by households show the same rates of growth,
we would expect the ratio of capital consumption to gross capital for-
mation to rise more rapidly in the business sector, if only because of
the shift from longer-lived construction to shorter-lived producers'
durable equipment, and because of the reduction in the share of net
changes in inventories in gross capital formation. Hence, we would
expect the share of business in net private capital formation to decline,
even though its share in gross private capital formation was constant
or rising moderately—and this is what we find.
Second, prices of construction have risen more than prices of other
goods—partly a reflection of the technological backwardness of that
sector compared with industries turning out producers' durable equip-
ment and even most consumer commodities. As a result, the trends in
the structure of capital formation in current prices are markedly dif-
ferent from those in the structure of totals in constant prices. More
important, the increase in relative prices of construction may be
viewed as a causal factor in reducing the demand for its volume in
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constant prices relative to the demand for other components that have
become cheaper. This, clearly, lies behind the greater drop in the
share of the household sector (nonlarm residential construction) in the
totals in constant prices than in the totals in current prices.
Finally, the volume of both business and household capital forma.
tion can be related to the number of ultimate consumers, via the de.
mand for new housing and for additional quantities of other goods
for whose production new business capital formation is needed. It
was thus possible to show in Chapter 4 that the relative trends in house-
hold and in business capital formation can be reduced to trends in
the number of ultimate consumers, in their demand for housing and
other goods, and in the relevant capital-output ratios that link capital
formation with the production of final goods.
SHARES OF SELECTED INDUSTRY SECTORS IN
NET BUSINESS DURABLE CAPITAL FORMATION
For net flow of business construction and producers' durable equip-
ment in 1880—1948, we can draw upon the several monographs to dis-
tinguish the shares of agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and the
regulated industries. These accounted for about 80 per cent of net
durable capital formation in the business sector in 1880, and have dom
mated that sector throughout the period. The trends summarized be-
low are for shares in the total of these industries (the allocable total)
in constant prices, and are observed over three subperiods, 1880—1900,
1900—1922, and 1922—1948.
1. The share of agriculture in the allocable total of net durable capi
tal formation shows no decline, the percentages for the three suc-
cessive subperiods being 12, 17, and 12. But these are lower than agri-
culture's share in the allocable stock in 1880—32 per cent; hence, the
share of agriculture in the allocable stock declined—to 18 per cent in
1948.
2. The share of mining and manufacturing (combined) in the
allocable total of net durable capital formation rose, from 38 per cent
in 1880—1900 to 47 per cent in 1900—1922, and to 49 per cent in 1922—
1948. These shares are appreciably higher than the sector's share in
the initial stock in 1880—11 per cent; the sector's share in the allocable
stock, therefore, increàsed—tó 39 per cent in 1948.
3. The share of the regulated industries in the allocable total of
net durable capital formation declined, dropping from 50 per cent in
1880—1900 to 36 per cent in 1900—1922, then rising to 38 per cent in
408Summary of Findings
1922—1948. These shares are all lower than the share of the sector in
the initial stock in 1880—57 per cent; the share of the sector in the
allocable stock, therefore, declined—to 44 per cent in 1948.
4. The trends in the shares of the sectors in net durable capital for-
mation are different from the trends in their shares in volume of out-
put or net product originating (also in constant prices). In both totals,
the share of agriculture declined (in volume of output, from 36 per
cent in 1880 to 10 per cent in 1948, and in net product, from 55 to 14
per cent). In both totals the share of mining plus manufacturing rose
(in volume of output, from 59 to 74.5 per cent, and in net product,
from 38 to 59 per cent). In both totals the share of the regulated in-
dustries rose sharply (in volume of output, from 5 to 15 per cent, and
in net product, from 7 to 27 per cent).
5. The initially different distributions of net capital stock and of
output, and the divergent trends in the shares of the sectors in net
durable capital formation and in output result in wide differences
among the several sectors in both the initial average capital-output
ratios and their trends. The ratio of net capital stock (durable) to net
income originating in 1880 was 1.7 for agriculture, 0.9 for mining and
manufacturing combined, and as high as 23.6 for the regulated indus-
tries. By 1922, the ratio for agriculture had risen to 2.3, and that for
mining and manufacturing to 1.8. While by 1948, the ratio for agri-
culture had declined to 2.0, and that for mining and manufacturing to
1.0, these terminal ratios were still higher than those in 1880. By con-
trast, the ratio for the regulated industries declined to 5.6 in 1922, and
to 2.5 in 1948. This decline was large enough to dominate the total:
the over-all ratio dropped from 3.0 in 1880 to 2.7 in 1922, and then
precipitously to 1.6 in 1948.
6. There was clearly convergence among the major sectors with re-
spect to their capital-output ratios: in 1880, they were 1.7, 0.9, and
23.6; in 1948, they were 2.0, 1.0, and 2.5, respectively. Convergence was
also observed within these sectors in the detailed studies which dis-
tinguish regions in agriculture and industries within mining, manu-
facturing, and the regulated sector.
The few paragraphs above summarize the discussion in Chapter 4,
which is, in turn, a summary of the more detailed analysis in the
monographs. Upon the many findings presented in the monographs,
two general comments are appropriate.
First, the rapidity with which capital-output ratios changed—even
those for the major sectors—is impressive. To illustrate: the ratio for
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manufacturing rose from 0.8 in 1880 to 1.3 in 1900,arise of more than
one-half the initial value in two decades. It then declined from 1.58
in 1922 to 0.98 in 1948. In agriculture the ratio dropped from 1.7 in
1880 to 1.5 in 1900, and then rose to 2.3 in 1922, again, a rise of more
than half its value in about two decades. And the speed with which
the ratio declined in the regulated industries sector has already been
noted. For narrower industrial divisions, the average capital-output
ratio obviously changed at even greater rates, and when we shift from
average to marginal ratios, both the trends and fluctuations become
more prominent. Thus, even if we deal, as in this work, with averages
over long periods, the capital-output ratios for separate sectors move
quite rapidly. There is somewhat more stability in the nationwide
ratios, but this means in essence that secular stability in the capital-
output ratio is to be expected for wide aggregates and has little to do
with the technological factors that have impact upon specific industries.
Second, the convergence among industries—the reduction in the
range of the capital-output ratios—is clearly a significant phenomenon.
Sectors that begin their growth with high ratios of capital to output,
are likely to experience a rapid decline in their ratios, as extensive
expansion of capacity intended for the long future subsides, and as
the high ratio of capital per unit of output provides extra incentives
for capital saving innovations. On the other hand, the emergence and
growth of high capital-output ratio industries may, in and of itself,
serve to raise the capital-output ratios in other industries, by facilitat-
ing greater mechanization and concentration, and by setting new pat-
terns of business organization that extend the feasible scale of firm
operation. It is hardly an accident that the growth of the regulated
industries and the reduction in their capital-output ratios coincided
with the greater industrialization of agriculture and mechanization of
mining and manufacturing and the rise in the capital-output ratios of
those sectors, at least to the 1920's. But such convergence has its limits.
It is not unlikely that the next decades will show no further con-
vergence, if new sectors with high capital-output ratios loom larger
than they did during the recent decades.
Trends in the Share of Internal Financing (Chapter 5)
The attempt to establish meaningful trends in the financing of capital
formation encounters two new obstacles. The first, and more obvious,
is that our estimates extend back only to 1900, and financing flows are
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far more sensitive to wars, major depressions, and other disturbances
than are capital formation and national product flows. With two world
wars, a decade of cold war, and one of the greatest depressions on
record—all within some five to six decades—the establishment of long-
term trends is difficult, and the results perforce subject to serious
qualification.
The second obstacle encountered is even more difficult to overcome.
Financing is a process that can best be judged from the standpoint of
the individual capital using unit—the household, the business firm, the
government agency. Ideally, we should have data for each unit rather
than aggregates, and they should cover periods short enough to be
unaffected by cancellation of borrowing by repayment. Even then,
the units would be found to use not only capital goods but also financial
assets, with shifts from one type of asset to another and one type of
liability to another. Unfortunately, our data are aggregates for large
groups, canceling claims and obligations among units and over sub-
stantial time periods. Consequently, we can distinguish between in-
ternal and external sources of funds, not for each decision making unit,
but only for large industry aggregates; we cannot reduce net changes
in sources of funds to the underlying gross borrowing and repayment;
and we can associate certain sources of funds with capital formation
only by dint of somewhat unrealistic assumptions. More important, our
estimates tend to overstate the share of internal financing and under-
state the share of external financing—as these are viewed by individual
economic units; and the long-term movements they show reveal only
part of the change that may have occurred in the structure of financing.
They must, therefore, be treated as only a partial account of the trends
in the relation between capital formation and the financing flows.
For business units, internal funds are capital consumption and de-
pletion allowances plus net undistributed income—a total referred to
as gross retention. For households, in connection with nonfarm resi-
dential housing, internal funds are the estimated equity shares in the
cost of new housing (including land and major alterations), derived
by subtracting from total cost the mortgage advances (and sales con-
tracts, which are quite small). For governments, internal funds are
derived as the difference between capital outlay and net borrowing,
or between additions to assets and net changes in debt. In each case,
the basic difference between internal and external financing is that
the fund using units have greater discretion in regard to the former
than the latter—since external financing involves a decision not only
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by the user but also by the lender. Unless otherwise indicated, we dis-
cuss here financing gross of capital consumption allowances, related,
naturally, to gross capital formation or to total uses of funds.
1. For the economy as a whole, the ratio of internal financing to
total uses declined, and correspondingly, the ratio of external financing
to total uses rose—but the changes were moderate. From 1900 to 1929
the former averaged 0.53; from 1930 through 1955 it averaged 0.42.
For selected normal periods, 1900—1909 (or 1901—1910), 1920—1929 (or
1921—1930), and 1945—1955 (or 1946—1956), it averaged 0.60, 0.58, and
0.56, respectively. The trend in the average ratio of gross retention to
gross capital formation was also downward: it dropped from 0.72 in
the first three decades to 0.61 in the last two and a half; and, over the
selected periods, it moved from 0.78 to 0.76 and to 0.77.
2. This decline in the countrywide ratio of internal financing was
associated largely with a decline in the ratio of internal financing for
households (in connection with nonfarm residential housing) and
for the federal government. In nonfarm residential housing, capital
formation and total uses of funds are taken as identical, and the ratio
of internal financing to that total declined from 0.44 in 1901—1930 to
0.28 in 193 1—1955; or, in the three selected periods, from 0.65 to 0.37
to 0.27. For the federal government, the vast noncapital expenditures
out of borrowed funds during the depression and World War II, and
even in some of the later years, made for the decline in the ratio of
internal funds to total uses or to capital formation (excluding military
durables). Even in 1900—1929, internal funds were negative, averaging
about —$0.2 billion per year;in 1930—1955, they averaged close to
—$7 billion. This increase in the federal government's reliance on
external financing contributed heavily to the rise in the share of ex-
ternal sources in the countrywide totals and thus to the decline in
the share of internal sources.
3. By contrast, the trend in the ratio of internal financing for the
business sector—the combined total of agriculture, nonfarm unincorpo-
rated business, and corporations—and for state and local governments
was upward, though in some cases only moderately so. For the business
sector, the ratio of internal sources to total uses rose from 0.59 in 1900—
1929 (or1901—1930)to 0.72 in 1930—1955 (or 1931—1956), but in the
latter period the ratio was exaggerated by the peculiar experience of
the depression and the war years. The ratio in the selected periods
shows but a mild rise, averaging 0.59 in the first decade of the cen-
.tury and in the 1920's, and rising to 0.64 in the post-World War II
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years. The movement of the ratio of internal financing to gross capital
formation was also upward. For state and local governments, the rise
in the ratio of internal financing was more conspicuous: the average
ratio to total uses rose from 0.52 in 1900—1929 to 0.80 in 1930—1956,
and in the selected periods moved from 0.47 to 0.56 to 0.72. The ratio
to gross capital formation also rose, and fairly continuously.
4. Within the business sector proper, the trend in the ratio of in-
ternal financing differed for the three major subdivisions. For agri-
culture, the trend was definitely upward: the ratio to total uses moved
from 0.60 in 1900—1929 to 0.91in1930—1955, and in the three selected
periods, from 0.72, to 0.66, to 0.83. The ratio to gross capital formation
reveals similar trends. No such clear trend is observable for nonfarm
unincorporated business. True, the average ratio of internal financing
to total uses rose from 0.72 in 1900—1929 to 0.81 in 1930—1955, but in
the selected periods it was 0.63, 0.78, and 0.63, respectively; and in
the ratio to gross capital formation there is similarly no evidence of
a rising trend. For both agriculture and nonfarm unincorporated
business, the conclusions are affected not only by the fact that our
estimates are limited to net aggregates but also by the relatively large
volume of entries and exits. Exits from agriculture add to external
financing if the retiring farmers, in selling their farms, convert their
accumulated savings into debts of the purchasers in the form of mort-
gages on the hitherto unencumbered farms. Such additions to ex-
ternal financing have no connection with capital formation or uses
of funds. Then, too, shifts of unincorporated units to corporate status
tend to withdraw those units that have accumulated substantial in-
ternal funds, substantial relative to their uses. Internal financing ratios
may be understated by these shifts in and out of the two sectors; but
the effects on trends cannot even be conjectured.
5. For corporations, the dominant group of the business sector, the
ratio of internal financing shows a slight upward trend. The ratio
to total uses (nonfinancial corporations) averaged 0.57 in 190 1—1929
and 0.67 in 1930—1956; and in the selected periods free from wars and
major depressions, it averaged 0.55 (in 1901—1912), 0.55 (in 1923—1929),
and 0.61 (in 1946—1956). The average ratio to gross capital formation
(all corporations) was 0.91 in 1901—1929 and 0.97 in 1930—1956; in the
selected periods, it was 0.85, 0.92, and 0.91, respectively.
6. For business corporations, we can also compare net retention
(corporate savings) with net capital formation or net total uses, both
unadjusted—as were the gross flows—for effects of changes in valua-
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tion of inventories or difference between cost and replacement bases
of capital consumption. The ratio of net retention to net capital for-
mation shows aslightupward trend, averaging 0.34 in 1901—1929 and
0.39 in 1930—1956, and in the selected periods, 0.33 (in 1901—1912),
0.28 (in 1923—1929), and 037 (in 1946—1956). The ratio of net retention
to total uses shows no such rise, averaging 0.22 in 1901—1929 and in
1930—1956, and in the selected periods, 0.22, 0.17, and 0.23, respectively.
7. Among corporations, we have separate data for mining and manu-
facturing, and the regulated industries. In mining and manufacturing,
the average ratio of gross retention to plant and equipment expendi-
tures rose, from 0.88 in 1900—1914 to 1.04 in 1920—1929, and to 1.12 in
1946—1953. For large manufacturing corporations, the ratio of gross re-
tention to total uses shows no distinct trend, averaging 0.70 in 1900—
1910, 0.97 in 1920—1929, and 0.67 in 1946—1953, but the samples are
too small (particularly in the early years) to warrant much confidence
in the results. In the regulated industries, the trend is much more
prominent: the ratio of gross retention to total uses averaged, roughly,
0.2 in 1901—1910 and 0.62 in 1941—1950.
Before we make any general comments upon the findings, the reader
must be warned of the qualifications, which apply particularly to
trends inferred from ratios in which changes over time are neither
large nor consistent. With this caution, the following comments are
offered.
First, one is impressed by the diversity of the trends in the in-
ternal financing ratios in the several sectors. In some, they decline
quite markedly, as in nonfarm residential real estate and the federal
government; in some, they rise appreciably, as in the agriculture sec-
tor, the regulated industries, and state and local governments; in still
others, no marked trends are discernible, as in nonf arm unincorporated
business, or the trends are only slightly upward, as in mining and
manufacturing corporations. In addition, for some sectors, the trends
differ as we take the ratio of internal financing to total uses—the more
defensible comparison—or as we relate internal financing to capital
formation alone. The diversity of trends reflects the differences in
complexes of factors that determine the financing of capital formation
or total uses in the several sectors—at least as revealed by our data. The
forces that may have contributed to diminished reliance by households
on equity funds and greater reliance on mortgages in purchasing non-
f arm residential housing—the decline in the ratio of the value of house
units to average income, the increasing stability of consumer incomes,
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the growing assistance of government guarantees, and the wider ac-
ceptance of consumer credit—are different from the forces that affect
the ratios of internal financing of corporations and other business units.
They are different also from the factors determining financing by the
federal government. There are differences also between the factors de-
termining financing by the federal government and those determining
financing by the business sector. Even within the business sector proper,
the factors that set the financing ratios for the major industry groups
can differ widely.
Second, while disparate complexes of factors affect the financing
ratios for the different sectors of the economy, those sectors are parts of
a coordinate, operating system. What happens in one, must affect the
others. Consequently, there are some lines of association among the
different trends, and these too can be discerned. Thus, the factors that
made for huge federal government deficits during the last two to two
and a half decades and lowered the ratio of internal financing for that
sector also made for improvement in the net income position of the
agricultural sector. They permitted it and many industries within
private business to earn their capital consumption allowances and to
effect substantial net savings, which helped raise their internal financ-
ing ratios. The same factors, contributing as they did to greater
stability of consumer incomes as well as to rising price levels, made
possible greater reliance on external financing by households in con-
nection with nonfarm residential housing. In other words, behind the
declining shares of internal financing in some sectors and the rising
shares in others there were common factors. As a result, the financing
ratios for the country as a whole tended to be more stable in the long
run than those for the individual sectors.
Finally, there is a seeming contradiction between the marked rise
in the ratio of capital consumption to gross capital formation, ob-
served in Chapter 4, and the rather moderate rise in the share of in-
ternal financing for the economy, when we exclude the federal gov-
ernment with its use of capital funds to cover current expenditures.
Earned capital consumption allowances should represent internal
financing; and a marked long-term rise in their ratio to gross capital
formation would lead us to expect a sizable rise in the share of internal
financing. Yet even for the business sector, the upward trend in the
share of internal financing is moderate relative to the rise in its ratio
of capital consumption to gross capital formation.
There are essentially two reasons for the difference. One is that the
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financing ratios cover only the period since 1900—not since 1869—and
for that shorter period, the rise in the ratio of capital consumption to
gross capital formation was not so large as for the longer period. The
second is that our analysis of capital formation deals with totals ad-
justed for inventory valuation changes and the difference between the
cost and replacement bases of capital consumption allowances. In the
analysis of financing, however, we emphasized the unadjusted totals,
in which the general rise in prices tends to reduce the rise in the ratio
of capital consumption allowances to capital formation (both in con-
stant prices). While that reduction in the rise of the ratio of capital
consumption should presumably be offset by a rise in the ratio of
net undistributed profits, a complete offset apparently did not occur—
at least so far as our estimates for corporations indicate. Thus, whereas
in the adjusted totals the average ratio of gross retention to gross
capital formation rose from 0.72 in 1897—1914 to 0.88 in 1940—1956
(or 0.81 in 1946—1956), in the comparable unadjusted totals (differing
somewhat from those utilized above) the ratio rose from 0.71 to 0.83
(or 0.78)—12 instead of 16 (or 7 instead of 9) points. Finally, in relating
gross retention to total uses (rather than to gross capital formation),
we included changes in financial assets, usually short-term; and ex-
ternal financing is far more dominant in the financing of those assets
than it is in the financing of gross capital formation.
Trends in the Structure of External Financing (Chapter 6)
External financing of an economic unit means provision of funds from
the outside, either equity in the form of stocks, or debt financing—long-
term or short-term. Such financing may flow directly from the lender
to the user, or via financial intermediaries (banks, insurance companies,
etc.). The detailed discussion of long-term changes in such financing
can best be summarized if we deal separately with trends in: (1) dis-
tribution of external financing, by category of user of funds; (2) share
of equity financing; (3) long-term and short-term debt financing; (4)
shares of financial intermediaries.
DISTRIBUTION, BY CATEGORY OF USER OF FUNDS
1. In the distribution of the economy's total external financing, the
striking rise in the share of the federal government is the dominating
trend: the share rose from an average of 0.08 in the first three decades
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of the century to an average of 0.49 in the last two and a half. For the
three selected periods (the first decade in the century, the 1920's, and
the post-World War II years), the rise was less striking but still marked,
the average ratio moving from 0.01, down to —0.09, and up to 0.11.
For the selected periods, the average share of the household sector (non.
farm residential housing) also rose, moving from 0.17 to 0.33 and to
0.25. The share of state and local governments tended to be stable in
those periods, the average share being 0.09, 0.13, and 0.09, respectively.
The shares of the other sectors—agriculture, corporations, nonfarm
unincorporated business—declined.
2. The average share of households in total private external financ-
ing rose markedly, from 0.26 in the first three decades to 0.35 in the last
two and a half, and moved from 0.19 to 0.34 to 0.32 in the three se-
lected periods. The average share of corporations shows no distinct
trend, remaining at a level close to 0.60. That of agriculture declined
markedly; that of nonfarm unincorporated business declined only
slightly.
3. Within total external financing for the business sector, corpora-
tions were dominant, accounting for two-thirds to almost nine.tenths,
disregarding the World War II years. The trend in their average share
was upward, from about seven-tenths in the first two decades of the
century to close to nine-tenths either in the 1920's or in the post-World
War II years. The shares of agriculture and nonfarm unincorporated
business declined.
These trends in the distribution of total external financing among
users are due to a combination of the trends in the external financing
ratios within each sector with the trends in the shares of the sectors
in total uses or total financing for the country. Thus, the decline in
the share of the business sector in total external financing is a product
of the decline in the share of external financing within the business
sector (discussed in Chapter 5) and the slight decline in the share of
the sector in total uses (which changed from an average of 0.7 in the
first decade of the century to somewhat over 0.6 in the 1920's and in
the post-World War II years). Much of the discussion in Chapter 5,
as well as in Chapter 4 (on the shares of users in gross capital forma-
tion), is relevant here in accounting for the trends summarized above.
SHARE OF EQUITY. FINANCING
We can study equity financing only in the form of net stock issues—
for the corporate sector alone. For the unincorporated sectors, equity
417Summary of Findings
funds may be contributed by various informal arrangements, but we
cannot gauge their volume or ascertain their precise character.
1. For all nonfinancial corporations, the share of net stock issues in
total external financing declined, although not consistently: it aver-
aged 0.35 in the first three decades and 0.27 in 1930—1955, rising from
0.31 in the first period of the century to 0.43 in the 1920's, only to
decline sharply to 0.21 in the post-World War II decade. The share in
all long-term external financing (i.e., excluding short-term debt fi.
nancing from the denominator) moved similarly, but the decline was
not as marked: the movement was from an average of 0.46 in 1901—1929
to 0.43 in 1930—1955, and in the three selected short periods (1901—
1912, 1923—1929, and 1946—1955), from 0.38 to 0.47 and to 0.34.
2. The trends in the shares of net stock issues in either total ex-
ternal or long-term external financing can also be studied separately
for the mining and manufacturing corporations and for those in the
regulated industries (referred to as public utilities). For both groups
these trends were downward, although they were no more consistent
over time than those for nonfinancial corporations as a whole.
3. The share of equity financing in external financing—measurable
here only for stock issues—can be studied for all business, for the
private sector, and for the economy as a whole. In every case, the share
of equity financing declined in the long run. For example, the share
in total external financing for the country dropped from an average
of 0.17 in 1900—1929 (or 1901—1930) to 0.07 in 1930—1955 (or 1931—
1956), and moved from an average of 0.12inthe first two decades to
0.20 in the next two, and to 0.07 in the last decade and a half.
In the attempt to explain the trend in the share of equity financing,
it is best to emphasize its share in long-term external financing, which
excludes the possible effects of a rise in short-term debt (summarized
below). The question, then, is why the use of equity funds by corpora-
tions declined relative to long-term external financing—a question that
may seem all the more puzzling since the large corporations are in the
best position to issue stocks, and the weight of the larger firms in the
corporate total must have increased.
The answer suggested in the detailed discussion notes the recent
disparity in cost in favor of long-term debt relative to equity money
(yield of stocks), the tax advantage of deductible payments on fixed
debt, as well as the increasing willingness of corporations to assume
such debt in view of their stronger position and of the general expecta-
tion of rising prices. While all these are relatively recent factors, so
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is the decline in the share of equity financing in long-term external
financing. As to the possible effect of the growing proportion of large
corporations in the direction of raising the share of net stock issues, it
may have been offset not only by their greater willingness to assume
long-term debt obligations, but also by the possibly increasing share
of internal financing in total financing within these larger units. Hence,
their growth meant less than a proportional contribution to long-
term external financing—whether equity or debt.
LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM DEBT FINANCING
Short-term debt is limited here to notes and accounts payable, because
short-term bonds and notes (maturing within five years) could not be
segregated from other bonds and notes before 1919. Consequently,
short-term debt is understated and long-term debt overstated, although
for most periods and for a definition that limits short-term debt to
not much more than two years, the unwarranted shifts in proportions
are rather minor.
1. For all nonfinancial corporations, the ratio of short-term debt
financing to all external financing rose, averaging 0.22 in the first
three decades and 0.38 in 1930—1955, and in selected periods (1901—
1912, 1923—1929, and 1946—1955), 0.18, 0.09, and 0.37, respectively.
This means that the trend in the ratio of long-term external financing
(equity and debt) to total external financing was downward. The ratio
of short-term debt financing to all debt financing also rose, from an
average of 0.34 in 1901—1929 to 0.52 in 1930—1955 and, in the selected
shorter periods, moved from 0.27 to 0.16 to 0.47. For the mining and
manufacturing corporations, there were similar movements in the
ratio of short-term debt financing to either total external financing or
to total debt financing.
2. For agriculture, we classified debt to banks, federal agencies, and
others as short-term, and mortgage loans as long-term. On this defi-
nition, the ratio of short-term debt financing to external financing or
to total debt financing (the two are identical for unincorporated sec-
tors because there are no equity issues) rose: it was roughly 0.3 in the
first three decades and somewhat over 0.6 in the last two and a half,
and moved from 0.5 in 1900—1914 to 0.6 in 1945—1955. As in the case
of corporations, however, the movement was not consistent over time.
3. For nonfarm unincorporated business, the trend in the ratio of
changes in short-term debt (debt to banks) to total debt financing or
to total external financing is in doubt. The ratio did rise from an aver-
419Summary of Findings
age of 0.43 in the first three decades to 0.56inthe last two and a half,
but the movement was not consistent over time and the estimates are
not very reliable.
4. For the business sector as a whole, the trend in the ratio of short.
term debt financing to total external financing was upward. The same
is true for the private sector (business firms and households). The pic-
ture changes with the inclusion of governments for which all debt is
treated as long-term, since the distinction between long-term and short-
term was not possible for the early years, and is much less significant
than for the private sector. For the country as a whole, the ratio of
short-term debt financing to total debt financing or to total external
financing shows little or no rise, averaging 0.23 or 0.21 in the post-
World War II decade compared with 0.23 or 0.19 in 1901—1912 or
1900—1914.
The rise or lack of rise in the ratio of short.term debt financing to
external financing or to total debt financing in the private sector may
be due either to trends in the differential cost and availability of short-
term versus long-term credit, or to trends in the ratio of short-lived
assets and in the related ratio of such assets to external financing. If
it could be shown that either the trend movements or even the changes
from period to period in the ratio of short-term debt financing rela-
tive to long-term were associated with relevant changes in differential
cost and availability, at least a tentative explanation could be claimed.
But the comparisons in the detailed discussion do not confirm this
hypothesis. The ratio of short-term debt financing generally did not
rise when the differential cost of short-term credit declined, nor did
it decline when the differential cost rose. The alternative hypothesis
seems more relevant: for corporations and for agriculture, there is a
much closer association between changes in the ratio of short-term
debt financing to total debt financing (or to total external financing)
and those in the ratio of changes in short-term assets (inventories and
financial claims) to changes in long-term assets (durable real assets).
And if we associate internal financing with long-term assets alone, we
can also calculate the ratio of changes in short-term assets to external
financing and observe that its changes are correlated with those in the
ratio of short-term debt financing to external financing. The rationale
for these correlations is clear. First, the acquisition of a short-term
asset by an economic unit can more easily be financed by short-term
than by long-term funds. Second, for an aggregate which includes both
borrowers and lenders, the very rise in the relative share of financial
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claims (classified as short-term assets) means pan passu a rise in the
weight of short-term debt. Thus, if a manufacturing corporation ac-
quires notes receivable through a sale to another manufacturing corpo-
ration, both notes receivable and notes payable in the manufacturing
sector rise.
SHARES OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
The intermediaries here comprise banks (Federal Reserve, commercial,
mutual savings banks including the postal savings system, and savings
and loan associations); insurance companies (private life, private and
public pension funds, casualty, fire, and so on); and a miscellaneous
group ranging from mortgage companies, investment houses, brokerage
firms, etc., to government lending institutions, and personal trust de-
partments.
1. The share of financial intermediaries in countrywide external fi-
nancing rose from 0.44 in 1900—1929 to 0.65 in 1930—1949 and, in se-
lected periods (1901—1912, 1923—1929, and 1946—1949), from 0.48 to
0.49 to 0.68. But their share in countrywide total financing also rose,
from 0.21 in the first three decades to 0.38 in the last two and a half,
and in three selected decades (the first of this century, the 1920's, and
the post-World War II years), from 0.19 to 0.21 to 0.30.
2. The rise in the share of financial intermediaries in external financ-
ing was pervasive, occurring in the external financing of most of the
major users: state and local and federal governments; households—
although not continuously; nonfinancial corporations; and, with less
consistency, agriculture, and nonfarm unincorporated business. This
was not as true of the share of financial intermediaries in total financ-
ing, simply because in some sectors the ratio of external to total financ-
ing declined, and that tended to offset the increased importance of
financial intermediaries in providing external funds. Thus, for the
business sector as a whole, the average share of financial intermediaries
in total financing changed from 0.17 in the first three decades to 0.15
in the recent two and a half. It was the household and government sec-
tors that accounted for the rise in the share of financial intermediaries
in total financing for the country as a whole.
3. There were distinctive trends in the structure of financial in-
termediaries, weighted by the size of their assets. In total assets of all
intermediaries, the shares accounted for by commercial banks, savings
banks, and personal trust departments declined, and it was the drop in
the shares of the first two that reduced the share of the banking sector
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from an average of somewhat over six-tenths in the first two decades of
the century to less than four-tenths in the post-World War II years. The
shares of the various groups of insurance and retirement funds rose.
The share of the insurance sector as a whole also rose, from an average
of almost one-sixth of the total before the 1930's to almost four-tenths
in the post-World War II years. Within the miscellaneous group, the
shares fluctuated and the long-term trends are not clear. The share of
land banks and of the combined group of investment companies, stock
brokers, and investment-holding trusts and factors apparently de-
clined; that of government lending institutions rose. But only the
latter trend is clearly significant. Finally, we note the rise in the aver-
age share of government institutions (Federal Reserve Banks, govern-
ment lending institutions, government pension and security funds),
from 7 per cent in 1901—1922 to 21 per cent in 1913—1939, and to 27
per cent in 1930—1955.
The changing role of financial intermediaries in the financing of
this country's economy has been discussed in detail in Raymond Gold-
smith's monograph,' and we need not go beyond the thumbnail sum-
mary above. Some brief general comments, however, are in order.
First, the rise in the shares of financial intermediaries in external and
total financing reflects their increased use by individuals and house-
holds, the main source of the nation's savings. This long-term shift in
what might be called the financial habits of ultimate savers (including
also unincorporated enterprises, and even corporations) is a result of
far-reaching changes in the pattern of economic and social life. To
illustrate: the increase in the proportion of employees and the decline
in the proportion of self-employed in our working population meant a
shift from savings flowing directly into the saver's business to savings
that are generally deposited by the employee-saver in some financial
intermediary. Likewise, the increase in urbanization meant easier ac-
cess of the population to the financial institutions, and the multiplica-
tion of facilities also encouraged greater use of financial intermediaries
by ultimate savers. We should, therefore, have expected to find many
of the trends summarized above even if there had been no marked
changes in the distribution of income by size, no decisive increase in
the size and diversity of government institutions, no marked shift
toward security orientation in the channeling of savings.
Second, these shifts did occur, however, and are clearly reflected in
iFinancial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900 (Princeton for
NBER, 1958).
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the trends in the structure of financial intermediaries. It need not be
emphasized that the shifts not only meant changes in the relative
weights of various types of intermediaries but also contributed to a
rise in the shares of all intermediaries in total and external financing.
If reduction in the share of upper income groups in income lowered
the proportion of savings seeking venture capital investment, it also
lowered the share of savings channeled directly through purchase of
stocks rather than through intermediaries. Likewise, the quest for se-
curity, leading as it did to shifts among intermediaries, also meant a
moving away from the direct channeling of savings into investment.
Finally, insofar as there were these distinctive shifts in the movement
of ultimate savings through channels other than those prevailing earlier,
there may.have been shifts in the forms of financing discussed above.
If either the ultimate savers or the financial institutions to which they
entrust their savings are committed to channel the funds into certain
types of investment only (say long-term fixed debt), the resulting effect
on differential costs of alternative types of financing may influence the
would-be users' choice. Conversely, the pressure of an important user,
like the federal government, for marketing its fixed-interest securities
may cause the shifting of funds from one type of financing to another,
or even between direct and indirect channeling of savings. The trends
in the shares and structure of financial intermediaries are, therefore,
associated with those in the structure of external financing.
The Long Swings (Chapters 7 and 8)
In addition to the trend movements that can be observed over periods
longer than twenty-five or thirty years, there are swings in the growth
rate or even in the absolute volume of many important economic
components. These swings, approximately twenty years long, are quite
distinct from business cycles and must be considered in any discussion
of long-term changes in the economy.
The statistical evidence on these swings is of two types. For many
economic variables, such alternations in the rate of change are so
prominent that continuous annual or quinquennial series show them
directly, without any statistical manipulation of the original record.
This is true—to cite a few cases—of gross nonfarm residential con-
struction; of gross durable capital expenditures by railroads; of net
changes in inventories (a partly conjectural series); of net changes in
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claims against foreign countries; of net additions to total population;
of net immigration; of internal migration of the native born; of stock
market prices, and of stock yields. For almost all of these, the evidence
extends back to the 1870's; and, for those for which evidence is avail-
able for years before the Civil War, there is clear indication of the
existence of long swings even in the earlier decades.
For other economic components, the long swings are not so promi-
nent and may be overshadowed either by trend movements or by
shorter-term changes associated with business cycles. In such cases
the long swings become apparent when the series is smoothed by a
moving average and plotted on a ratio scale, which reveals the alterna-
tions in the percentage rate of growth. But it must be stressed that the
long swings brought to light by this treatment of the series are not
statistical illusions—a mere product of the statistical procedures. It
is true that a major short rise or decline much above or below the
underlying trend—extending over a single year or two, or over a single
business cycle—would affect all the ordinates of the moving average
in which it is included, and that average would thus stretch out a
short change into a long swing. But economic theory leads us to ex-
pect that—other factors being absent—such short breaks would be fol-
lowed by a canceling reaction. Thus, the lack of such a reaction would
in itself indicate the existence of a long swing. Likewise, long swings
in the percentage rate of growth are no less real than those in the
absolute volume of an economic process.
The main difficulty in our discussion of long swings is not in estab-
lishing their existence or their wide amplitude in some important eco-
nomic variables, but in explaining them, in uncovering the links in
their transmission. In recent decades, for which data are more plenti-
ful, two major wars and the Great Depression (in large part, a post-
war maladjustment) affected the long swings so clearly that it is all too
easy to interpret them as war and war-conditioned phenomena. But
such an explanation is obviously inapplicable to the decades before
World War I. For earlier decades when no major wars occurred, our
data are scanty, and cover only two long swings back to the 1870's—
not a large sample to rely upon. Some previous studies of these move-
ments have been made, but our detailed discussion in Chapters 7 and S
and the summary below are, perforce, limited to empirical findings
with only suggestions of a few explanatory links.
1. Additions to total population, net immigration, net excess of
births over deaths, and net internal migration of the native born dis-
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play long swings approximately twenty years in duration. Although
some of the series are annual, others are quinquennial or even decen-
nial, and no precise timing study is possible. Itis clear, however,
that the amplitude of the swings is wide and has widened in recent
decades.
2. Nonfarm residential construction and durable capital expendi-
tures by railroads (both gross, in constant prices) display long swings
roughly coincident with (or lagging slightly behind) those in popula-
tion additions, immigration, and net internal migration—and pre-
sumably in response to these population movements. Similar swings
may characterize other population-sensitive components of capital for-
mation (such as construction of stores, offices, and some public utilities
other than railroads), but these components cannot be segregated over
a period long enough to serve the present analysis.
3. Until the 1920's, these long swings in population growth and in
population-sensitive capital formation were coterminous with opposite
swings in other capital formation—total, and in such components as
net changes in inventories, net changes in foreign claims, and per-
haps "other" private construction and producers' durable equipment
combined (excluding capital expenditures by railroads). But the nega-
tive association between the long swings in population-sensitive and
other capital formation shifted to a positive association beginning
with the 1920's, suggesting that tle factors that set limits before the
1920's and prevented synchronous acceleration in both population-
sensitive and other components of capital formation ceased to be op-
erative after World War I.
4. The inversion of long swings in other capital formation to those
in population additions and population-sensitive capital formation
before the 1920's, and the difference in timing between long swings in
additions to the labor force and those in population affected the long
swings in additions to gross commodity product (gross national prod-
uct, excluding services) and additions to the flow of goods to con-
sumers, total and per capita. In particular, the long swings in addi-
tions to flow of goods to consumers per capita tended to be inverted
to those in additions to population and in net immigration, although
with some lag—at least before the 1920's. There is thus a suggestion
of a mechanism by which swings in population additions produced
opposite swings in the capacity to add to consumer goods per capita;
and the opposite swings induced a reversal in the swings in popula-
425Summary of Findings
tion growth and immigration (the upswing in immigration being a
response to the pull of this country as reflected in additions to con-
sumer goods per capita). This, however, is a bare suggestion and there
were, most likely, many other factors operating. Moreover, the asso-
ciation ceased after World War I.
5. Gross national product and flow of goods to consumers, total and
per capita, all reveal long swings whose relative amplitude tended to
widen. There were, naturally, similar swings in net national product,
total and per capita. But the long swings in total capital formation,
gross and net, become evident only in recent decades, because in the
earlier decades the movements in the population-sensitive and in the
other components offset each other.
6. It follows that the ratio of gross capital formation to gross na-
tional product—whether average or marginal—displays the long swings
prominently; and so does the ratio of net capital formation to net
national product. These swings, until the recent decades, were inverted
to those in gross and net national product.
The findings above relate to real flows—the volume of production in
constant prices—and to the population and labor force. For the swings
in financial flows the data are even scantier and we must supplement
them by some indirect evidence.
7. There are long swings in the structure of capital formation, in
current prices, i.e., in the shares of various user sectors, in the appor-
tionment by type of capital good, and in the ratios of capital con-
sumption allowances and net capital formation to gross capital forma-
tion for durable types of business capital. Insofar as these components
are subject to or represent different types of financing—internal or
external, or different types of external financing—long swings in their
shares imply corresponding swings in the structure of financing. But
our data do not permit us to observe these long swings in the structure
of countrywide financing directly, except for the recent decades when
the effects of wars dominate the picture (and the period covered is too
short for our purpose, anyway).
8. There were clearly marked long swings in stock market prices
and stock yields back to the 1880's, when our series begin. This finding
can be brought to bear upon long swings in financing by calculating
for at least two groups—railroads, and mining and manufacturing cor-
porations—the swings in the ratio of stock yields to. bond yields. A
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comparison of that ratio with the ratio of net stock or net bond issues
to total net issues for the two corporate groups reveals the expected as-
sociation: in most cases, a long upswing of the differential that makes
bonds relatively cheaper is associated with a long upswing in the ratio of
net bonds to total net issues, and vice versa. The data are crude and the
conclusion necessarily tentative. However, the comparison does sug-
gest that the association is present, and that long swings in the differen-
tial cost of bonds and stocks are roughly synchronous with similar move-
ments in the bond-stock ratio in net issues.
9. Finally, for agriculture, mining and manufacturing corporations,
and nonfarm residential construction, we can observe financing ratios
for time units short enough to reveal whether long swings exist. For
agriculture, we have quinquennial data back to 1900, and total uses
do reveal swings—although markedly only in recent decades. More im-
portant, these swings are related to those in the financing ratios. An
upward movement in total uses or in capital formation is associated
with a similar movement in the external financing proportion and
an opposite movement in the internal financing ratio; a downward
movement in total uses or in capital formation is accompanied usually
by a decline in the external financing proportion and a rise in the in-
ternal.
10. For mining and manufacturing corporations, we observe long
swings in plant and equipment expenditures and can study the ratio
of gross retention and of net security issues to those expenditures.
Here again, even more clearly than in the case of agriculture, long
swings in capital formation are accompanied by similar swings in the
ratio of net security issues (external financing) to capital formation,
and by inverted swings in the ratio of gross retention to capital forma-
tion. And the long swings in nonfarm residential construction also ap-
pear to be positively associated with swings in the ratio of external to
total financing, and negatively associated with swings in the ratio
of internal to total financing.
One final general comment on this problem of long swings is appro-
priate. There is little doubt about the existence of such movements in
some major economic flows in the past. And if some important eco-
nomic flows reveal such swings prominently, the very association be-
tween these flows and other processes of the economy is likely to in-
duce similar (or opposite) swings elsewhere. Alternations in gross capi-
tal formation are likely to induce swings in capital consumption, in
the ratio of the latter to gross capital formation, and hence possibly
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in the ratio of gross retention or internal funds to capital forma-
tion or to total uses. In short, the association among the real flows, and
between them and the financial flows, both in space and in time, would
lead us to expect that long swings found to be conspicuous in some real
flows would be transmitted, though with modification, to other parts
of the country's production and its financial framework.
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